Hunting For Metamorphic JavaScript Malware by Musale, Mangesh
San Jose State University
SJSU ScholarWorks
Master's Projects Master's Theses and Graduate Research
Spring 2014
Hunting For Metamorphic JavaScript Malware
Mangesh Musale
San Jose State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_projects
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
This Master's Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Master's Theses and Graduate Research at SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Master's Projects by an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@sjsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Musale, Mangesh, "Hunting For Metamorphic JavaScript Malware" (2014). Master's Projects. 359.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.31979/etd.ky84-3b5q
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_projects/359
Hunting For Metamorphic JavaScript Malware
A Project
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Computer Science
San Jose State University
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science
by
Mangesh Musale
May 2014
c○ 2014
Mangesh Musale
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
The Designated Project Committee Approves the Project Titled
Hunting For Metamorphic JavaScript Malware
by
Mangesh Musale
APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENTS OF COMPUTER SCIENCE
SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY
May 2014
Dr. Mark Stamp Department of Computer Science
Dr. Thomas Austin Department of Computer Science
Dr. Sami Khuri Department of Computer Science
ABSTRACT
Hunting For Metamorphic JavaScript Malware
by Mangesh Musale
Internet plays a major role in the propagation of malware. A recent trend is
the infection of machines through web pages, often due to malicious code inserted
in JavaScript. From the malware writer’s perspective, one potential advantage of
JavaScript is that powerful code obfuscation techniques can be applied to evade de-
tection. In this research, we analyze metamorphic JavaScript malware. We compare
the effectiveness of several static detection strategies and we quantify the degree of
morphing required to defeat each of these techniques.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Internet has evolved into the greatest medium of communication and data ex-
change that the world has ever known. Since its inception, the Internet has matured
from just an academic experiment into an effective communication system. Since the
late 1990s, it has became a vast interconnected source of information and services
widely used for commercial and personal purposes. This evolution has led to the
emergence of social networking, online banking and advertising, among various other
commercial and non-commercial uses.
Transactions over the Internet often involve the transfer of sensitive data which
attackers like to tap and exploit. For example, bank account information, medical
records and passwords are routinely transferred over the network. Unfortunately,
user’s personal computer is a weak link in this system wherein personal computers
typically run a large number of applications which are rarely managed properly. Single
visit to a compromised web page is sufficient to infect a web browser, particularly the
one that has not been updated with recent security patches.
Web browsers are often infected through malicious code inserted into legitimate
JavaScript on a website [24]. When a user visits such a compromised website, these
malicious JavaScript programs are automatically loaded with HTML code in the web
browser. Execution of such malicious JavaScript can expose the personal data of the
user. The majority of malicious JavaScript redirects the web browser to load more
malicious content from a remote server. This can be achieved through several means,
such as adding an HTML iframe element to a page [19]. While there are relatively
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few ways to obfuscate HTML code [35], JavaScript makes it possible by providing a
vast array of methods to hide the payload.
In this research, we analyze a metamorphic JavaScript malware that is designed
to infect other JavaScript files in the same folder. We consider a variety of static
detection techniques and quantify the effectiveness of each. We also measure the
degree of morphing required to defeat each of these detection strategies.
This paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide background infor-
mation on malware with an emphasis on metamorphic malware. Chapter 3 outlines
the specific metamorphic JavaScript malware that forms the basis for the research
in this paper. Then in Chapter 4, we cover the Rhino JavaScript engine and dis-
cuss the modifications required for our experiments. Next, we discuss four different
metamorphic detection techniques that we apply to the metamorphic JavaScript de-
tection problem. Specifically, we consider Hidden Markov Model, an Opcode Graph
similarity method, a distance measure inspired by Simple Substitution Cryptanaly-
sis, and Singular Value Decomposition. These topics are covered in Chapter 5. Our
experimental results for the original metamorphic JavaScript appear in Chapter 6.
We consider an enhanced metamorphic JavaScript malware in Chapter 7 and provide
the experimental results for this challenging case. Chapter 8 contains our conclusions
and a consideration for future work.
2
CHAPTER 2
Background
Malware is a software program designed to do malicious activities on a user’s
computer with the intention of extracting information and exploiting resources with-
out his consent. Such programs either stop normal execution of benign programs
or they start executing along with benign code to do malicious activities. They de-
stroy files by infecting them or by deleting them, stealing sensitive user information.
According to the execution pattern and internal structure, malicious softwares are
categorized as follows:
2.1 Encrypted Malware
Signature detection is one of the trivial methods for malware detection in which, a
pattern of bytes or instruction sequence is extracted as a signature of that particular
malware. Then, every file is compared against the extracted signatures to check
whether a given file is a malware or a benign file. To overcome this detection method,
malware writers came up with Encrypted Malware. In such a type of malware, the
entire body of malware is encrypted by using one of the encryption techniques. Code
to decrypt this encrypted malware is also attached to its body. As a result of this,
signature based detection method is unable to find a pattern in the file and decryption
code will decrypt the malware at the time of execution, which will not affect the
normal execution of malware. Cascade was the first virus of this kind which appeared
in 1987 [20].
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2.2 Polymorphic Malware
As the decryption code is not encrypted in Encrypted Malware, antivirus writers
were able to extract the pattern from decryption code. The need to hide decryption
code gave birth to Polymorphic Malware. In Polymorphic Malware, code to decrypt
malware is morphed after every infection. Morphing is done in such a way that
the internal structure of code gets changed completely without any change in the
functionality [20]. This makes signature extraction hard. First polymorphic virus
named 1260 was developed by Washburn in 1990 [28].
2.3 Metamorphic Malware
Metamorphic Malware is an advanced version of Polymorphic Malware. In this
malware, internal structure of the malware gets changed after every execution. But
the overall functionality remains the same [16]. There are various methods by which
this can be achieved. Let us discuss a few of them.
2.3.1 Subroutines Permutation
Function definition can be inserted between any two statements in the code.
Using this feature, malware writers reorder the function definitions, keeping the order
of function call unique. This will give structurally different but functionally same
software. Suppose, we have 𝑛 different functions in the code, then these functions
can be arranged in 𝑛! different ways. This gives 𝑛! different morphed versions of
the same code. Metamorphic malware such as win32/Ghost has used this type of
subroutine permutation technique [37].
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2.3.2 Instruction Reordering
In this method, independent instructions are reordered in a program scope. Here,
independent instructions refer to those instructions whose execution does not depend
on any previous instruction. This reordering will give us quite a large number of
morphed versions of the same code [20]. If we have 𝑛 independent instructions in the
scope of a program, then we can generate 𝑛! different morphed versions. Illustrated
below is a simple example of addition of two numbers.
1: int a = 10;
2: int b = 20;
3: int c = a + b;
Here in statements 1 and 2, we declare two variables a, b and assign them constant
values 10 and 20 respectively. Declaring a variable does not depend on any other
statement. Therefore, in this example, statement 1 and 2 are independent instructions
which can be arranged in any order. But, statement 3 depends on statement 1 and
2. Statement 3 adds two variables a and b, but to add them they must be declared
and assigned some value. Therefore, statement 3 must appear after statement 1 and
2. Considering all these dependencies, the above code can be reordered to achieve
the same functionality as shown below.
2: int b = 20;
1: int a = 10;
3: int c = a + b;
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2.3.3 Instruction Substitution
In this method, morphed copies are generated by replacing an instruction or
a group of instructions by a functionally equivalent instruction or group of instruc-
tions [32]. For example,
SUB EBX EBX
can be replaced as
AND EBX 0x0000
SUB instruction subtracts the content of register B from the register B itself i.e., the
code wants to clear register B. Same effect can be achieved through bitwise multipli-
cation of register B contents with zero.
2.3.4 Register Swapping
In this method, morphed copies are generated by changing registers used in the
instructions. This is a very simple way of code obfuscation. Win95/Regs wap [29]
malware is such a kind of malware. Consider an example where we want to fetch
the value from stack and load it into one of the registers for the next operation. POP
EAX can be replaced with POP EBX if EBX register is free at this moment. One of the
drawbacks of this method is it does not alter the opcode sequence.
2.3.5 Garbage Instruction Insertion
In this method, morphed copies of malware are created by inserting instructions
in software which will not affect execution [6]. Such ‘do-nothing’ instructions are used
in creating morphed copies of malware such as Win95/ZPerm [29]. Examples of such
instructions are NOP instruction or ADD EBX 0. Instructions like INC and DEC can be
used in succession to increase the value in one of the registers and bring it back to
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original.
2.4 Detection Techniques
There are several techniques to detect a malware. Different characteristics of
malware are used in detection techniques such as statistical analysis on opcodes,
pattern matching of bytes for a particular malware family. Some of the popular
techniques are mentioned below:
2.4.1 Signature Based Detection
In this technique, content of malware is compared against the signature dictio-
nary to check whether the given file is malware or benign. A dictionary for known
malware signatures is maintained and updated by anti-virus vendors. A signature is
an algorithm or hash (a number derived from a string of text) that uniquely identifies
a specific virus. Depending on the type of scanner being used, it may be a static
hash, which in its simplest form, is a calculated numerical value of a snippet of code
unique to the virus.
2.4.2 Machine Learning Based Detection
Machine learning is a very widely used concept in computer science. Hidden
Markov Model (HMM) is one of the most popular machine learning techniques used
to detect malware [27]. In this technique, a HMM is trained against known malware
opcode sequence. This trained model is used to score files to be analyzed. If the score
is more than a predefined threshold, then it is fairly good to say that the given file
belongs to a malware family.
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2.4.3 Opcode Graph Based Detection
In this technique, a digram frequency graph is constructed from opcode sequence
of known malware. Similar graph is constructed for the file to be analyzed. Score of
this file is calculated by taking absolute difference between corresponding elements in
the graph. Lesser the score, higher is the probability of the file being a malware [22].
We will discuss more about this technique in Section 5.2.
2.4.4 Simple Substitution Based Detection
This technique is based on the assumption that frequency distribution of opcodes
hold true to a certain extent for every malware family. In this technique, a digram
frequency graph is constructed from an opcode sequence of a known malware and the
file to be analyzed. A frequency count is taken for each unique opcode in the known
malware. Frequency distribution of opcodes from known malware samples is mapped
with frequency distribution of opcodes from files which are to be tested. The score for
each file is calculated by the same method used in Jakobsen’s algorithm for Simple
Substitution Cryptanalysis [13]. If the score for a file is less than a precalculated
threshold, then it is reasonable to conclude that the file belongs to a malware family.
Implementation details for this method are described in Section 5.3.
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CHAPTER 3
Transcriptase
Transcriptase malware was originally designed by Sperl [25]. Transcriptase is a
metamorphic malware implemented in JavaScript. Execution of this script infects
all the JavaScript files in the folder where the malware script is placed. As a result
of this infection, a morphed version of the malware script gets attached to benign
JavaScript files in the folder. Whenever this infected JavaScript gets executed in any
other folder, it infects other benign JavaScript files. For each infection, malware script
generates a new morphed version. The malware script carries its code in a custom
designed meta-language.
The morphing scheme used in this malware helps to evade signature based de-
tection method. The meta-language code here is compiled using a compiler written
in JavaScript. Compiler code is also a part of the malware body. Advantage of defin-
ing a custom meta-language is that the malware writer can add extra information
required to create the morphed versions. The general syntax used for an instruction
in this malware sample is shown below
(Identifier |Restrictions) meta-instruction
Identifier and Restrictions are used by the permutation function for code obfuscation.
Identifier is the unique identification for a statement in the script and Restriction is a
list of statements which must be executed before the given statement. Details of this
scheme is described in Section 3.1. These meta-instructions are used to create actual
instructions in the script. Compiler creates a new malicious JavaScript in three steps
as shown below:
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∙ Permutation and Variable/Function-Name Randomization
∙ Code Creation
∙ Variable/Function Insertion
3.1 Instruction Permutation
In this part of the code, compiler parses the meta language code, scope by scope
and collects all the information about instructions and their corresponding restric-
tions. It analyzes the code in the given scope and starts permuting instructions
considering their dependencies. For example, consider the following code
(100|) var a=1;
(200|) var b=0;
(300|) def c=1;
(400|200)c+1(b);
(500|400 ,100)c+n(b,a);
(600|500) xWScript.Echo(b);
Here, first number is the identifier for the instruction. This remains unique in the
entire JavaScript. Numbers after ‘|’ indicate dependencies of the given instruction.
Instruction with identifier 200 does not have any number after ‘|’, shows that it
does not depend on any other instruction. Instruction 200 is var b = 0. This is
declaration of variable and assigns it a value 0. To declare a variable and assign it
some constant value does not have any dependency on previous instructions.
But if we look at instruction 400, c + 1(b), to execute this instruction we need
the value of variable b. Variable b is declared and assigned a value at instruction 200.
Therefore, 200 appears in instruction 400 after ‘|’ to indicate dependency.
10
Permutation function reads this information and uses it to rearrange the instruc-
tion. As we observe, there is no number after ‘|’ in instructions 100, 200 and 300, it
means that these instructions are independent of any other instructions in the script.
So, they can be rearranged as
(300|) def c=1;
(100|) var a=1;
(200|) var b=0;
(400|200)c+1(b);
(500|400 ,100)c+n(b,a);
(600|500) xWScript.Echo(b);
Here, we changed the order of instructions as 300, 100, 200 without any effect on
the functionality of the script. These three independent instructions can be arranged
in 3! different ways. Due to the fast growth-rate of the permutation function, this
technique is very useful in case of large number of instructions.
3.2 Variable/Function Name Randomization
The compiler searches for keywords like var, def and function in all instructions
of the script. Then it gets the hard coded strings used to define them and replaces
them with random strings. It then replaces all occurrences of these hard-coded strings
in the current scope with the newly generated random string. For example, consider
the following function definition.
function makeSquare (number ){ return number*number ;}
var num=1;
def sqr=makeSqare(num);
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Compiler searches for var, def and function keywords. Here, it will find makeSquare,
number, num and sqr variable names. Then it will generate random strings and map
each string with one variable name and replace it in the current scope. After that, it
will search for the same variable name in upper scopes till the global scope is reached.
After this step, the new form of code will be
function pkjuoledrbnx(qerdslds ){ return qerdslds* qerdslds ;}
var hxedlkerd = 1;
def cadwkgd = pkjuoledrbnx(hxedlkerd );
3.3 Meta Language Symbols
After permutation of instructions and function/variable name randomization,
the compiler parses the meta-language code and derives a valid JavaScript statement
for every statement in meta-language. While deriving the actual instruction, several
meta-language symbols are processed each having a special meaning. Compiler inter-
prets them at runtime and generates appropriate javascript literals. For instance:
var number = #n1n#;
var str = #"Hello_World"#;
var exp = #xntruenx #;
Here, #n...n# is interpreted as the value at position ... is a numerical value and
#"..."# is interpreted as the value at position ... is a string value. Furthermore, #xn
... nx# is interpreted as the value at ... is a JavaScript literal like true or false,
where 𝑛 can be any integer. At this step, each symbol is replaced with original
JavaScript language literal.
12
3.4 Variables/Functions Insertion
During the compilation, many variables and functions are defined (either due to
the meta-code itself, or due to obfuscation). They are not yet placed in the code, but
are saved in special arrays. At the end of the code creation, they are placed in the
code. Functions can be inserted between any two instructions in the global scope.
Variables can be inserted between any two instructions in the current scope before
they get used for the first time. This insertion takes a long time because the whole
code has to be analyzed several times to find potential positions [17].
3.5 Miscellaneous Challenges
At the time of code creation, the compiler creates random functions. These
functions perform arithmetic calculations and return integer values between 0 to 255.
They are then used to represent ASCII values of characters to derive strings. This
makes the code highly obfuscated.
Compiler creates an array of functions. Use of this array of functions in con-
structing strings makes the code highly unreadable. It is very hard to read and
understand such a code in one parse [17].
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CHAPTER 4
Rhino
In 1997, Netscape started working on a project to bring about a version of
Netscape Navigator developed fully in Java. For this, they came up with a JavaScript
engine which was also developed in Java. This JavaScript engine was named as the
Rhino Project which is now maintained by Mozilla [21]. Rhino compiles JavaScript
into Java classes and can operate in two modes—compiled mode and interpreted
mode. In compiled mode, Rhino first compiles JavaScript and then converts it into
Java bytecode. Then this bytecode can be run as a Java program. This improves the
execution time of JavaScript.
4.1 Architecture
Rhino JavaScript Engine consists of four basic building blocks—Parser, Byte-
Code Generator, Interpreter and JIT. The JavaScript source code is first fed to a
Parser which parses the code and converts it into an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST).
Then this AST is fed to the ByteCode Generator which generates the bytecode. This
bytecode is used by the Rhino Interpreter which converts it into machine code with
the help of JIT. Finally, this machine code gets executed [33]. Block diagram of Rhino
JavaScript Engine can be visualized in Figure 1.
Parser: Parser takes JavaScript code as input and generates AST. Parser knows
the meaning of every JavaScript literal and its functionality. First it tokenizes the
JavaScript and then operates on each token to convert it into AST. Consider the
following example of finding Greatest Common Divisor(GCD) by binary algorithm:
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Figure 1: Rhino Block Diagram
function GCD(num1 , num2)
{
if (num2 > num1)
{
var temp = num1;
num1 = num2;
num2 = temp;
}
while (true) {
num1 %= num2;
if (num1 == 0) return num2;
num2 %= num1;
if (num2 == 0) return num1;
}
}
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Parser parses the code and generates an AST as shown in Figure 2. In this tree, each
non-leaf node represents the operation to be performed like subtraction, comparison
etc. and each leaf node represents the operands like num1 and num2. This tree can
be viewed as one of the paths that the program will traverse.
ByteCode Generator: Once AST is formed, then the ByteCode Generator will
convert this into bytecode. ByteCode Generator converts AST into bytecode, block
by block. For example, it will pick a block of the tree which subtracts two variables
and convert it into bytecode as shown below.
iload_1
iload_2
isub 3
istore_3
These bytecodes can be interpreted as—load the first variable stored at offset 1 and
2 into a register. Then subtract them and store the value at offset 3.
Interpreter: Interpreter takes the output generated by ByteCode Generator as
input. Interpreter then with the help of JIT converts the bytecode into machine level
code. This machine code then gets executed at runtime. Above generated bytecode
will be converted as shown below.
MOV EAX 0xFF20
MOV EBX 0xFF24
SUB EAX EBX
MOV ECX EAX
The main challenge faced by Rhino JavaScript engine is that the JavaScript does
not have classes and it is a dynamic language. Because of this nature of JavaScript,
there are lot of complex optimization techniques that have to be used to squeeze out
performance. Few of them are listed below:
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Figure 2: Abstract Syntax Tree
∙ Starting time of JavaScript engine
∙ Generation of temporary classes
∙ Optimization of compiled code
∙ Garbage Collection
∙ Sandboxing the execution for security
4.2 Modification
Main purpose of this experiment is to compile JavaScript in machine level code
which would extract opcodes from the compiled file to train Hidden Markov Model.
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As Rhino is completely developed in Java, and being an open source software, its
code is readily available and easily comprehensible.
There are certain limitations in Rhino which are purposely implemented at the
time of its development. As the latency in compiling JavaScript directly affects the
page load time, being a part of the web browser, Rhino compiles only small JavaScript
files. There are different levels of optimizers which optimizes class files for faster exe-
cution. This optimization sometimes loses original statistical properties of JavaScript
which are used in analysis.
To deal with this problem, we decided to modify Rhino in such a way that it can
compile JavaScript of any length and disable optimization. As we are not interested
in the class file, we decided to extract opcodes at compile time. This saved the time of
decompilation of class file to extract opcode sequence. This also solved the problem of
optimization, as we were extracting opcodes before it creates a class file. We tapped
the opcode generated by opcode generator and redirected it to the standard output
stream. This will print all the generated opcodes to a screen. The generated output
can be collected in a file using redirect operation in Unix. Command to run Rhino:
java -classpath <path to js.jar> org.mozilla.javascript.tools.jsc.Main
<Path to JavaScript file>
Figure 3 shows standard output of Rhino after compilation. After compiling
JavaScript, we will find a new class file generated in the same folder. Modified Rhino
generates a class file same as the class file without modification. But in addition to
the class file, a list of opcodes is also generated. This list can be observed in Figure 4.
We can write this output to some file using redirect operator (>).
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Figure 3: Sample Compilation Without Modification
Figure 4: Sample Compilation With Modification
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CHAPTER 5
Statistical Malware Detection
Signature based detection method is widely used for malware detection. But
metamorphic malwares can easily evade the detection by altering their internal code
by using one of the techniques described in Section 2.3. Using these methods, the in-
ternal structure can be changed but to retain original functionality, same instructions
(instructions which are responsible for functionality) have to be used somewhere in
code. This keeps the statistical distribution of instructions unique in all the morphed
copies. Using these statistical properties, following malware detection techniques are
designed.
5.1 Hidden Markov Model Method
Hidden Markov Model(HMM) is a pattern recognition technique which can be
used to detect metamorphic malware. Recently, lot of research has been going on to
enhance this technique [2, 3, 8, 30, 31]. Sridhara [26] describes a method to train
HMM against opcode sequence extracted from the given malware family. This HMM
model is used to score the files and classify whether a file belongs to the given malware
family. If the score is greater than a predefined threshold, then it is concluded that
the file belongs to a given malware family. Scores are measured in terms of Log
Likelihood Per Opcode (LLPO).
5.1.1 Markov Chain
Consider a sequence of symbols. Each symbol is associated with a probability
which governs the transition from one symbol to other. Transition from one symbol
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Figure 5: Example of HMM
to another depends upon the probability of current symbol or in other words, not on
any previous symbol in the sequence. Such sequence is called as the ‘Markov Chain’ of
first order [18]. Similarly 𝑛𝑡ℎ order Markov Chain is defined as a sequence of symbols
in which transition from one symbol to other depends on previous 𝑛− 1 symbols. In
Hidden Markov Model terminology, each symbol is called as State.
Consider an example shown in Figure 5 [2]. In this example, we have two coins
one of which is biased and the other is normal. For the biased coin, probability of
getting a Heads after tossing it is 0.7 and getting a Tails is 0.3. On other hand for the
normal coin, probability of getting Heads or Tails after tossing it is 0.5. We tossed
a coin for 5 times which resulted in a sequence (H, T, H, H, T). H and T in this
sequence represents Heads and Tails respectively. In this sequence, getting Heads or
Tails depends on which coin we choose and each coin is associated with a probability
of getting either a Heads or a Tails. Therefore, this sequence forms a Markov Chain.
For this experiment, process of tossing coins is a Markov Process.
5.1.2 Hidden Markov Model
Hidden Markov Model(HMM) is a statistical model which represents a Markov
Process whose states are unknown [27]. In [27] describes the notation used in HMM
21
as follows:
𝑇 = length of the observation sequence
𝑁 = number of states in the model
𝑀 = number of observation symbols
𝑄 = {𝑞0, 𝑞1, . . . , 𝑞𝑁−1} = distinct states of the Markov process
𝑉 = {0, 1, . . . ,𝑀 − 1} = set of possible observations
𝐴 = state transition probabilities
𝐵 = observation probability matrix
𝜋 = initial state distribution
𝑂 = (𝑜0, 𝑜1, . . . , 𝑜𝑇−1) = observation sequence.
To get a better insight about HMM, consider the same example shown in Figure 5.
Here, length of the observation sequence 𝑇 is 5 as the coin is tossed for 5 times in
this process. We have two different symbols in the observation sequence i.e. H and
T. Therefore, value of 𝑀 for this Markov Process is 2 with 𝑉={H, T}. Transition
matrix 𝐴 for this process is
A =
[︂
0.95 0.05
0.20 0.80
]︂
where, the first row represents transition probabilities for the normal coin and the
second row represents transition probabilities of the biased coin. Value at position
(𝑖, 𝑗) represents transition of state from 𝑖𝑡ℎ state to 𝑗𝑡ℎ state. Observation probability
matrix 𝐵 for this process is
A =
[︂
0.5 0.5
0.7 0.3
]︂
where, the first row represents probability of getting each observation for normal coin
and the second row represents probability of getting each observation for the biased
coin. Information in this matrix can be understood as—if we choose a biased coin,
then probability of getting Heads is 0.7. We can pick any coin out of the given two
coins. So initial state distribution will be
𝜋 =
[︀
0.5 0.5
]︀
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Figure 6: Markov Process
Matrices 𝐴,𝐵, 𝜋 are row-stochastic which means that each row in these matrices
is a probability distribution. Here, we know the values of 𝐴,𝐵, 𝜋 and observation
sequence but not the coin used for each tossing. This part of process is hidden. A
model is defined using these known values as
𝜆 = (𝐴,𝐵, 𝜋)
Figure 6 gives a graphical view of the Hidden Markov Process. The state and ob-
servation of HMM at any point of time 𝑡 is represented by 𝑋𝑡 and 𝑂𝑡 respectively.
Initial state 𝑋0 and matrix 𝐴 determines the hidden part of the Markov Process, as
represented in the left half of Figure 6.
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5.1.3 HMM Implementation
Application of HMM for metamorphic malware detection is explained in greater
detail in [34]. HMM model is trained using opcodes, extracted from morphed copies
of malware belonging to a family. This trained model represents statistical properties
of the malware family. We can compute a score for any file to determine how similar
the file is to the malware family using trained HMM model. Then we can compare
this score with a predetermined threshold to classify the file.
A large number of morphed versions of given malware JavaScript are generated
and compiled using JavaScript compiler to obtain Java bytecode [21]. Then the
opcode is extracted from these Java bytecodes. All the opcodes in training dataset
are concatenated and then HMM is trained on this concatenated list of opcodes to
get statistical model of the given metamorphic JavaScript malware.
To detect whether the given file belongs to the same malware family or not, we
used previously generated model to calculate LLPO. If the LLPO of the program is
within a particular threshold, the file is classified as a virus.
5.1.4 Log Likelihood Per Opcode
Scoring observation sequences and training the HMM involves computation of
large number of products of probability distribution of opcodes. As 𝑇 increases, the
resulting value of this product exponentially tends to become 0. This introduces
a problem of underflow of results. To avoid this problem, forward and backward
algorithms normalize the result of each iteration. This process is called scaling [27].
After application of scaling, 𝑃 (𝑂|𝜆) will be calculated as
1
⧸︁ 𝑇−1∏︁
𝑘=0
𝑐𝑘
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where 𝑐𝑘 is the scaling factor at time 𝑘. However, this computation is also susceptible
to underflow and to avoid that, we compute Log Likelihood as
log[𝑃 |𝜆] = −
𝑇−1∑︁
𝑘=0
log 𝑐𝑘
Log Likelihood is length dependent, as the sum of log transition probabilities and log
observation probabilities will be higher for a longer sequence. As the sequence in the
test set may be of different lengths compared to the sequence used to train the model,
Log Likelihood will be divided by the number of opcodes in the sequence to obtain
Log Likelihood per opcode which accounts for the length difference [34].
5.2 Opcode Graph Similarity
Anderson [1] describes a graph based method for malware detection. In this
method, opcode sequence from given malware is extracted and a weighted directed
graph is constructed using this sequence. Similar weighted graph is constructed for
the file to be tested. Score for the file is calculated by taking Manhattan distance
between these two graphs. Algorithm to calculate score is described in Section 5.2.2.
5.2.1 Opcode Graph
A weighted directed graph constructed from extracted opcode sequence is called
as ‘Opcode Graph’. Each node of this graph is represented by a unique opcode from
the opcode sequence. A directed edge is drawn from one opcode to another, if and
only if, second opcode follows the first opcode in the sequence. Weight of the edge is
determined by the number of occurrences of digram. Consider the opcode sequence
shown in Table 1. This opcode sequence contains 30 opcodes. To construct a directed
graph of opcodes, we need the count of digrams. In this method, we will represent
this graph as an adjacency matrix as shown in Table 2.
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Table 1: Opcode Sequence
Sequence No Opcode Sequence No Opcode
1 MOV 16 AND
2 SUB 17 PUSH
3 TEST 18 PUSH
4 CALL 19 MOV
5 SUB 20 CALL
6 ADD 21 CALL
7 PUSH 22 MOV
8 PUSH 23 SUB
9 AND 24 MOV
10 AND 25 SUB
11 AND 26 MOV
12 CALL 27 SUB
13 LEA 28 MOV
14 LEA 29 SUB
15 ADD 30 SUB
Table 2: Digram Count Matrix
MOV SUB TEST CALL ADD PUSH AND LEA
MOV 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 0
SUB 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
TEST 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
CALL 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
ADD 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
PUSH 1 0 0 0 0 3 1 1
AND 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
LEA 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
If you observe the row corresponding to SUB and the column corresponding to MOV,
then you will get a count 3 for digram (SUB, MOV). If you observe opcode sequence in
Table 1, you will notice that MOV instruction appeared 3 times after SUB instruction
at line numbers 24, 26 and 28. Similarly, the count for each digram is tabulated in
Table 2.
Using Table 2, we will convert counts into probabilities by dividing each row
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entry by the sum of that row. The resulting values will indicate the probability of
occurrence of a particular opcode, after the selected opcode. For example, probability
of occurrence of TEST instruction after SUB instruction will be 1 divided by 7 (sum
of the entries corresponding to row SUB). After converting counts into probabilities,
Table 2 will now look like Table 3.
Table 3: Digram Probability Matrix
MOV SUB TEST CALL ADD PUSH AND LEA
MOV 0 5/6 0 1/6 0 0 0 0
SUB 3/7 1/7 1/7 0 1/7 0 0 0
TEST 0 0 0 1/1 0 0 0 0
CALL 1/4 1/4 0 1/4 0 0 0 1/4
ADD 0 0 0 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0
PUSH 1/6 0 0 0 0 3/6 1/6 1/6
AND 0 0 0 0 1/1 0 0 0
LEA 0 0 0 0 1/2 0 0 1/2
5.2.2 Similarity Calculation
Probability matrices for files to be compared are created by the procedure de-
scribed above. Similarity between two files is calculated by taking the Manhattan
distance between two probability matrices. Suppose 𝐴 is the probability matrix for
file 1 and each element in 𝐴 is represented as 𝑎𝑖,𝑗 where 𝑖 and 𝑗 represents 𝑖𝑡ℎ row
and 𝑗𝑡ℎ column. Similarly for file 2, 𝐵 is the probability matrix and each element is
represented as 𝑏𝑖,𝑗. Similarity is calculated by
score =
1
𝑁2
(︃
𝑁−1∑︁
𝑖,𝑗=0
|𝑎𝑖,𝑗 − 𝑏𝑖,𝑗|2
)︃
where 𝑁 is the number of unique opcodes under consideration.
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5.2.3 Implementation
To use this similarity score for metamorphic malware detection, we need to set
a suitable threshold. To set the threshold value, we followed the steps below:
1. Calculate opcode graph for known metamorphic malware samples.
2. Calculate opcode graph for morphed versions of malware samples.
3. Calculate opcode graph for benign files.
4. Calculate score for morphed versions vs known metamorphic malware samples.
5. Calculate score for benign files vs known metamorphic malware samples.
6. Set threshold based on step 4 and step 5.
For our implementation, we chose the highest score from step 4 and the lowest score
from step 5. Average of these two values is considered as the threshold. If score of
any file is less than this threshold, it is classified as a malware.
5.3 Simple Substitution Distance
Simple Substitution Distance method is a hill climbing technique based on Jakob-
sen’s algorithm for simple substitution cryptanalysis [13]. In this method, it is as-
sumed that frequency order of opcodes hold true to a certain extent for every malware
family. This allows us to calculate similarity between any two files using Jakobsen’s
algorithm. In Jakobsen’s algorithm, the score gives the degree to which the putative
plaintext matches the plaintext language statistics. The score given by Simple Sub-
stitution Distance method can be viewed as a measure of the distance between the
opcode sequence of a given file and the opcode statistics of a metamorphic family [23].
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5.3.1 Jakobsen Algorithm
Basic assumption in Jakobsen’s algorithm is that the plain text is in English
language and Ciphertext contains 26 different symbols. Each symbol maps to one of
the 26 different letters in English. Algorithm starts with calculating the frequency
of the symbols in the ciphertext and arranging them in the decreasing order of their
occurrence frequency. Putative key is then calculated by mapping these symbols from
the ciphertext to the letters in English arranged in the standard frequency order. This
key is altered in each iteration after looking at the obtained plain text. Suppose key
‘K’ is initial key, then it can be represented as
K = 𝑘1, 𝑘2, 𝑘3, . . . , 𝑘26
where each 𝑘𝑛 is mapping of one symbol from cipher text on some English letter.
In each iteration algorithm modifies key ‘K’ slightly. This new key is used to
decrypt ciphertext and then the newly generated putative plain text is checked. If
putative plain text is closer to the original plain text, then the change in key is retained
and algorithm starts again considering the obtained modified key as the putative key.
A scheme is followed to modify the key. Initially, symbols adjacent to each other
are swapped and cipher text is decrypted to check correctness of the key. Suppose,
we have the putative key as shown above, then initially swapping is done in 𝑘1 and
𝑘2. In next iteration, swapping will be done in 𝑘2 and 𝑘3 and so on. This can be
viewed as first round of swapping in which we swap adjacent element. In next round,
elements at places 𝑖𝑡ℎ and (𝑖 + 2)𝑡ℎ are swapped. In the successive rounds, distance
between to be swapped elements is increased by 1. In all, there can be
(︀
26
2
)︀
different
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ways in which the key can be altered. This scheme of swapping can be visualized as
round 1: 𝑘1|𝑘2 𝑘2|𝑘3 𝑘3|𝑘4 . . . 𝑘23|𝑘24 𝑘24|𝑘25 𝑘25|𝑘26
round 2: 𝑘1|𝑘3 𝑘2|𝑘4 𝑘3|𝑘5 . . . 𝑘23|𝑘25 𝑘24|𝑘26
round 3: 𝑘1|𝑘4 𝑘2|𝑘5 𝑘3|𝑘6 . . . 𝑘23|𝑘26
...
... . .
.
round 24: 𝑘1|𝑘24 𝑘2|𝑘25 𝑘3|𝑘26
round 25: 𝑘1|𝑘25 𝑘2|𝑘26
round 26: 𝑘1|𝑘26
To test the correctness of the key, algorithm creates a digram matrix of English
letters from plain text. Each entry in matrix represents frequency count of that
digram in plain text. This matrix is referred as 𝐸 matrix in the algorithm. Similarly,
another digram matrix is created from decrypted text. This matrix is called as 𝐷
matrix in the algorithm. Correctness of the key is calculated as
score (k) =
∑︁
𝑖,𝑗
|𝑑𝑖,𝑗 − 𝑒𝑖,𝑗|
where, 𝑑𝑖,𝑗 and 𝑒𝑖,𝑗 refers to 𝑖𝑡ℎ and 𝑗𝑡ℎ element in 𝐷 and 𝐸 matrices respectively. In
each iteration of the algorithm, the score is calculated. If the score is smaller than
the score obtained in previous iteration, it is retained else discarded. In other words,
lower the score, better is the decrypted text. At the end of the algorithm, if the
obtained decrypted text is the same as the original text, then the score will become
zero. As a result, we will get the key and decrypted text, which will be similar to the
original plain text.
5.3.2 Implementation
In this method, we extracted the opcode sequence from generated morphed ver-
sions of the given malware JavaScript. Then the frequency of each opcode is counted.
All opcodes are arranged in the decreasing order of their count. Consider we get the
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opcode order as
MOV, ADD, LOAD, SUB, JMP, CMP
This will be called as standard opcode order for the given malware. Then digram
frequency graph is constructed by using the same opcode sequence. In this graph,
each entry will represent frequency count of a digram. Adjacency matrix is used
to represent this graph. This adjacency matrix will be analogous to 𝐸 matrix in
Jakobsen’s algorithm [13]. The opcode sequence is then extracted from the file to be
tested. Frequency of each opcode is counted and arranged in decreasing order of their
frequency count. Suppose we get the opcode sequence as
ADD, SUB, CMP, LOAD, MOV, MUL, JMP
This opcode order is mapped to previously calculated standard opcode order. This
mapping will give us the putative key. Initial putative key is shown in Table 4. After
Table 4: Opcode Mapping (Putative Key)
Standard Opcode Order MOV ADD LOAD SUB JMP CMP OTHER
Test Opcode Order ADD SUB CMP LOAD MOV MUL JMP
doing one to one mapping, if testing file contains more unique opcodes, then they
will be mapped to dummy opcode OTHER. Then all opcodes in testing file are replaced
with corresponding opcode in the putative key. A digram matrix is created from
the replaced opcode sequence. This matrix is analogous to 𝐷 matrix in Jakobsen’s
algorithm. A score is calculated by taking Manhattan distance between the 𝐷 and 𝐸
matrices.
score =
∑︁
𝑖,𝑗
|𝑑𝑖,𝑗 − 𝑒𝑖,𝑗|
Key swapping is then done in the putative key by swapping the adjacent elements.
For example, we have the putative key as shown in Table 5. First swapping occurs
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between ADD and SUB to give a new putative key as shown in Table 6.
Table 5: Key Before Swapping
Standard Opcode Order MOV ADD LOAD SUB JMP CMP OTHER
Test Opcode Order ADD SUB CMP LOAD MOV MUL JMP
Table 6: Key After Swapping
Standard Opcode Order MOV ADD LOAD SUB JMP CMP OTHER
Test Opcode Order SUB ADD CMP LOAD MOV MUL JMP
By using this new key, we calculate scores for the given test file again. To reflect
the changes made in the key, we need to construct a new𝐷 matrix. The new𝐷 matrix
will be constructed by swapping the rows and columns in the previously constructed
𝐷 matrix. Suppose we have a 𝐷 matrix as shown in the Table 7.
Table 7: D Matrix before Swapping
MOV ADD LOAD SUB JMP CMP OTHER
MOV 9 7 8 6 3 2 1
ADD 9 7 5 8 5 8 3
LOAD 5 8 6 4 3 7 1
SUB 4 8 4 7 4 8 3
JMP 5 3 8 5 3 8 6
CMP 3 2 5 6 3 7 3
OTHER 9 6 0 2 5 9 7
As we swap entries corresponding to MOV and ADD in the putative key, to achieve
the same effect on 𝐷 matrix, we need to swap the rows and columns corresponding
to MOV and ADD. After swapping, we will get a new 𝐷 matrix as shown in Table 8.
Thereafter, score is calculated by taking the Manhattan distance between the
newly created 𝐷 matrix and 𝐸 matrix. If the new score is greater than the previous
score, then we discard the swapping and move towards next swapping. Here in this
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Table 8: D Matrix after Swapping
MOV ADD LOAD SUB JMP CMP OTHER
MOV 7 9 5 8 5 8 3
ADD 7 9 8 6 3 2 1
LOAD 8 5 6 4 3 7 1
SUB 8 4 4 7 4 8 3
JMP 3 5 8 5 3 8 6
CMP 2 3 5 6 3 7 3
OTHER 6 9 0 2 5 9 7
example, next swapping will be done between MOV and LOAD. If the new score is less
than the previously calculated score, then we will retain the swapping and continue
algorithm from beginning, keeping swapped key as the putative key.
In the first round, swapping will be done between adjacent elements in the key.
In next round, swapping will be done between elements on the 𝑖𝑡ℎ and 𝑖+ 2𝑡ℎ position
in the key. In successive rounds, distance between elements to be swapped is increased
by one. This swapping scheme can be visualized as
round 1: 𝑘1|𝑘2 𝑘2|𝑘3 𝑘3|𝑘4 . . . 𝑘𝑛−3|𝑘𝑛−2 𝑘𝑛−2|𝑘𝑛−1 𝑘𝑛−1|𝑘𝑛
round 2: 𝑘1|𝑘3 𝑘2|𝑘4 𝑘3|𝑘5 . . . 𝑘𝑛−3|𝑘𝑛−2 𝑘𝑛−2|𝑘𝑛
round 3: 𝑘1|𝑘4 𝑘2|𝑘5 𝑘3|𝑘6 . . . 𝑘𝑛−3|𝑘𝑛
...
... . .
.
round n-2: 𝑘1|𝑘𝑛−2 𝑘2|𝑘𝑛−1 𝑘3|𝑘𝑛
round n-1: 𝑘1|𝑘𝑛−1 𝑘2|𝑘𝑛
round n: 𝑘1|𝑘𝑛
The smallest score achieved in this process is the score of similarity. To classify a file,
this score is compared against a predefined threshold. If the score is less than the
threshold value, then file under consideration belongs to the given malware family.
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5.4 Singular Value Decomposition
Singular Value Decomposition is a technique used in image detection which can
also be used to detect malware files. Deshpande [9] describes a method based on
Singular Value Decomposition to detect metamorphic malware. The scores are cal-
culated by taking euclidean distance between weights of known malware sample and
unknown malware sample. Weights are calculated by projecting column vector of a
file on a space enclosed by eigenvectors of a known malware [14]. This enclosed space
is called as eigenspace.
Eigenspace is calculated by projecting eigenvectors of covariance matrix. Covari-
ance matrix is calculated as 𝐴𝐴𝑇 . Singular Value Decomposition of a matrix 𝐴 is
represented as
𝐴 = 𝑈𝑆𝑉 𝑇
where, 𝑈 is covariance matrix. 𝑆 is a diagonal matrix with square root of eigenvalues
common to both matrices 𝑈 and 𝑉 .
5.4.1 Algorithm
The algorithm works in two phases—Training Phase and Testing Phase. In
Training Phase, weights of known malware files are calculated by projecting them
on to the eigenspace. In Testing Phase, we project files to be tested on to the same
eigenspace and calculate their corresponding weights. Thereafter, euclidean distance
between previously calculated and newly calculated weights are taken to compare
them against the threshold value. Following sections will describe these two phases
stepwise.
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5.4.1.1 Training Phase
∙ In training phase, raw bytes from text or code section of training dataset are
extracted. These raw bytes are converted into decimal values to construct a
column vector.
∙ Then covariance matrix is constructed. Covariance matrix is a product of ma-
trix 𝐴 and its transpose. Matrix 𝐴 is constructed by appending all column
vectors. Suppose we have 𝜑1, 𝜑2, 𝜑3, . . . , 𝜑𝑀 column vectors, then matrix A can
be constructed as
𝐴 = [𝜑1 𝜑2 𝜑3 . . . 𝜑𝑀 ]
∙ Now, Eigenvectors for covariance matrix are calculated. These eigenvectors
determine eigenspace. Eigenvectors with large eigenvalues represents prominent
characteristics of a malware. So, we ignore eigenvectors with small eigenvalues.
∙ All eigenvectors are arranged in the descending order of their eigenvalues. For
our experiment, we consider top M’ eigen vectors from M eigenvectors (where
M’ < M). We project these eigenvectors onto the space. Space bounded by
these eigenvectors is called eigenspace.
∙ Original malware can be constructed by using these M’ eigenvectors by adding
them with their weights. Suppose for a malware 𝑉 we have 𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑒3, . . . , 𝑒𝑀 ′
eigenvectors with corresponding weights 𝑤1, 𝑤2, 𝑤3, . . . , 𝑤𝑀 ′ . Then malware 𝑉
can be reconstructed as
𝑉 = 𝑒1 × 𝑤1 + 𝑒2 × 𝑤2 + . . . + 𝑒𝑀 ′ × 𝑤𝑀 ′
𝑉 =
𝑀 ′∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑤𝑖 × 𝑒𝑖
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Therefore, weights for each sample can be obtained by
𝑤𝑖 =
𝑀 ′∑︁
𝑖=0
𝑒𝑇𝑖 × 𝑉
The obtained weights for a particular virus 𝑉𝑖 can be represented as
Ω𝑇𝑖 = [𝑤𝑖, 𝑤2, 𝑤3, . . . , 𝑤𝑀 ′ ]
∙ Obtained weights for all malware samples can be represented as ∆
∆ = [Ω1,Ω2,Ω3, . . . ,Ω𝑀 ]
5.4.1.2 Testing Phase
∙ In this phase, we first construct a column vector for each file which is to be
tested. If the size of the file is less than 𝑁 bytes, then column vector is appended
with zeros. And if size of the file is more than 𝑁 bytes, then column vector is
constructed by taking first 𝑁 bytes from file.
∙ This column vector is projected on to the previously calculated eigenspace.
Weights for file T which is to be tested can be calculated by
𝜔𝑖 =
𝑀 ′∑︁
𝑖=0
𝑒𝑇𝑖 × 𝑉𝑛
Ω𝑇𝑛 = [𝜔1, 𝜔2, 𝜔3, . . . , 𝜔𝑀 ′ ]
∙ Euclidean distance between Ω𝑛 vector and weight vector generated in training
phase can be calculated by
Distance =
√︁
(𝜔21 − 𝑤21) + (𝜔22 − 𝑤22) + . . . + (𝜔𝑀 ′1 − 𝑤𝑀 ′1 )
where, 𝜔 represents weight of test file and 𝑤 represents weight of training file.
∙ A threshold is calculated by testing few known malware files which belong to
the same malware family.
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Figure 7: SVD Process
5.4.2 Implementation
To implement above described algorithm to detect given JavaScript malware
family, we compiled JavaScript into Java byte code. To every byte code, there is an
equivalent hex value associated. We converted those hex values to decimal values.
Suppose we have 𝑀 files in the training dataset, each file having different number of
bytes. The largest file has 𝑁 bytes, using which an 𝑁 ×𝑀 matrix is created. Zeros
are appended to smaller files and first 𝑁 bytes are chopped from the larger files. This
matrix is called a covariance matrix.
We pass this matrix to JAMA API which is developed in Java to calculate eigen-
vectors and eigenvalues. These obtained eigenvectors form a eigenspace which is used
to calculate the weights. Weights for files which we want to test are calculated by
projecting their column vectors on the generated eigenspace. This whole process can
be visualized as shown in Figure 7. Once we get the weights for both the training set
and the files to be tested, then scores are calculated by taking the euclidean distance
between weights of the training files and the testing files. Experimental analysis of
given JavaScript malware is explained in Section 6.
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CHAPTER 6
Experiments
This chapter discusses about the experimental setup, files used in the experiment
and results obtained from these experiments. Experiment involves implementation
and testing of the following methods:
∙ Hidden Markov Model Method
∙ Opcode Graph Similarity Method
∙ Simple Substitution Distance Method
∙ Singular Value Decomposition Method
All these methods work on statistical properties of opcodes. Given malware files
are written in JavaScript. To convert JavaScript code into opcode sequence, we
used the Rhino JavaScript Engine. We modified Rhino in such a way that it gives
opcode sequence at compile time as discussed in Section 4. We performed all these
experiments on a machine with the following configuration.
Table 9: Machine Specifications
Model Lenovo ThinkPad T530
Processor 3rd Generation Intel Core i7-3110M @2.80GHz
RAM 8.00GB
System type 64-bit OS
Java Compiler Java 6
Operating System Ubuntu 12.10
The given JavaScript malware carries a morphing engine with itself. After every
infection, the internal structure of malware gets changed. For the experiments, we
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generated 100 morphed versions of the given malware. These files are used in training
phase and testing phase.
The experiments undertaken need benign files to test the proposed detection
method. We collected benign files from different open source JavaScript libraries [5,
7, 12, 15, 36]. Effectiveness of each method is judged by plotting Receiver Operating
Characteristics (ROC) curve [4]. Area under the ROC curve will give us the degree
of correctness for every individual method.
Table 10: Source of Benign Files
Source Number of files
Cassandra Project 5
DataTables Library 10
Flanagan’s book 5
jQuery 5
YUI Library 15
Total 40
6.1 Receiver Operating Characteristics
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve is a graphical representation for
correctness of classification system [4]. It is created by plotting true positives out of
the total actual positives (called as TPR = true positive rate) vs. the fraction of false
positives out of the total actual negatives (called as FPR = false positive rate), at
various threshold values. TPR and FPR are also known as sensitivity and fall out
of classification system. For plotting ROC curve, we first calculate probabilities for
true positive and false positive. Then a curve is generated by plotting the cumulative
distribution function of the true positive probabilities on the y-axis vs the cumulative
distribution function of false positive probabilities on the x-axis [11]. The Area Under
the Curve (AUC) of ROC gives a measure of correctness of classification. Following
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Figure 8: HMM Score Analysis (N=2)
sections will discuss results of above mentioned method by plotting ROC curves for
each method.
6.2 Hidden Markov Model
To test the correctness of HMM method, we did a number of experiments. It
has been observed that number of states do not make any significant difference in
the score calculation. So, we decided to continue with number of states equal to 2.
Opcode sequence for benign files and malware files are same as discussed above. We
randomly choose 20 opcode sequences from generated pool of malware samples to
train HMM. Then we calculated scores for rest of the malware samples and benign
files. To visualize the distribution of scores we plotted Scatter plot for the obtained
scores. Scatter Plot shown in Figure 8 clearly depicts the distinction between score
of malware and benign files.
The effectiveness of HMM can be judged using the ROC curve [4]. ROC curve
for the above described experiment is shown in Figure 9. As area under the curve
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Figure 9: ROC curve for HMM
(AUC) is 1, it shows that trained HMM model is correctly distinguishing between
virus files and benign files.
6.3 Opcode Graph Similarity Method
For this experiment, we used same malware files and benign files as discussed
above. Threshold is determined by the method described in Section 5.2.3. Purpose of
this experiment is to verify whether the computed scores for benign files and malware
files are distinguishable or not.
Scores are obtained in this experiment are plotted on scatter graph as shown
in Figure 10. Red points in graph shows scores of malware file vs malware file and
green points shows scores of malware file vs benign file. It can be observed from
Table 10 that scores for malware file vs malware file are in order of 10−2 while scores
for malware file vs benign file are in order of 10−1. From this, we can clearly conclude
that this method is distinguishing files correctly.
ROC curve for the experiment is shown in Figure 11. Area under the curve is 1,
which shows perfect classification between malware files and benign files.
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Figure 10: Opcode Graph Similarity Analysis
Figure 11: ROC curve for Opcode Graph Similarity Method
6.4 Simple Substitution Distance Method
For this experiment, we have randomly selected 10 virus files from a pool of
generated morphed copies of malware and 10 benign files. Their scores are listed
below in Table 11. Looking at the score in Table 11, we can conclude that distribution
of opcode frequency in malware samples is consistent. On the other hand, as the score
for the benign file is large, it shows that the distribution of opcode frequency differs
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Figure 12: Simple Substitution Method Scores Analysis
a lot.
Table 11: Simple Substitution Method Scores
File name Score File Name Score
Ben_1 2.65007 Virus_1 1.82535
Ben_2 2.52474 Virus_2 1.82537
Ben_3 2.49072 Virus_3 1.82537
Ben_4 2.58470 Virus_4 1.82537
Ben_5 2.65446 Virus_5 1.82539
Ben_6 2.66617 Virus_6 1.82539
Ben_7 2.64091 Virus_7 1.82537
Ben_8 2.65737 Virus_8 1.82537
Ben_9 2.66809 Virus_9 1.82539
Ben_10 2.64965 Virus_10 1.82537
Scatter Plot in Figure 12 clearly shows the distinction between scores of malware
and benign files. For the same experiment, we have drawn a ROC curve as shown in
Figure 13. Area under the curve is 1, which indicates perfect classification of files.
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Figure 13: ROC for Simple Substitution Method
6.5 Singular Value Decomposition Method
We randomly selected 20 samples of benign JavaScript and malware JavaScript
files from above mentioned pool of benign files and malware samples. Opcodes from
these files are then converted to decimal equivalent with the help of opcodes to hex
value mapping. Eigenspace is created using training malware samples. Weights of
files (files to be tested) are obtained by projecting their column vectors on previously
generated eigenspace. Scatter plot of these values is shown in Figure 14.
To test the effectiveness of experiment, we plot ROC curve for the scores obtained
in experiment. The ROC curve for the experiment is as shown in Figure 15. Area
under the Curve is 1. AUC 1 shows that algorithm described in Section 5.4 perfectly
distinguish between malware samples and benign samples.
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Figure 14: SVD Scatter Plot Analysis
Figure 15: ROC curve for SVD
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CHAPTER 7
Enhancement
Looking at the analysis of given malware using Hidden Markov Model, Simple
Substitution Method, Opcode Graph Similarity method and Singular Value Decom-
position method, it is clear that given malware can be detected by methods based on
statistical properties of opcodes. To evade such detection we executed an experiment
by inserting deadcode into given JavaScript malware.
To implement this, we have created a service which will run on central server.
Whenever malware gets executed, it creates a connection with this central server. A
random number n is passed to the service. This service will generate n number of
functions and send back to malware. The malware then adds this deadcode to its
body. By adding this deadcode, functionality will remain same but the statistical
characteristic of opcode sequence will change. This will help to evade detection by
above mentioned methods.
7.1 Hidden Markov Model
To evade the detection by Hidden Markov Model we modified the service which
will insert deadcode in controlled amount. We chose 20 morphed versions of the
given malware. Then we created different versions of chosen files by adding deadcode.
Initially we started with 100 random functions as deadcode. Then we compiled this
new version with the help of Rhino and got opcode sequence for chosen files. Scores
are calculated against previously calculated models.
We repeated the process with increasing number of deadcode function each time
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Figure 16: Hidden Markov Model AUC Analysis
and calculated scores for each case. After plotting ROC curve for these cases, it has
been observed that HMM can clearly distinguish between benign files and malware
files up to 2900 deadcode functions. Table 12 gives us an idea about decrease in Area
Under the Curve (AUC) of ROC as we increase the deadcode. The trend of change in
AUC can be visualized by the graph shown in Figure 16. Corresponding ROC curves
are shown in Appendix A, Section A.1.
Table 12: AUC for Hidden Markov Model
Functions AUC Functions AUC
100 1 6000 o.99517
200 1 7000 0.98028
300 1 8000 0.96922
400 1 9000 0.96528
500 1 10000 0.96294
600 1 11000 0.95439
700 1 12000 0.94709
800 1 13000 0.93387
900 1 14000 0.93307
1000 1 15000 0.92757
1500 1 16000 0.91845
2000 1 17000 0.90832
3000 1 18000 0.89851
4000 1 19000 0.88560
5000 1 20000 0.86933
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7.2 Opcode Graph Similarity Method
To evade detection by using Graph Similarity Method, we used the same exper-
imental setup. Graph Similarity Method is very sensitive towards deadcode. Scores
change very rapidly as compared to HMM for small amount of deadcode. Therefore,
for this experiment we started with adding 100 deadcode functions. In each iteration
we increased number of deadcode functions by 100. Table 13 shows the AUC for each
case. The trend of change in AUC can be visualized by graph shown in Figure 17.
Corresponding ROC curves are shown in Appendix A, Section A.2.
Table 13: AUC for Opcode Graph Similarity Method
Functions AUC Functions AUC
100 1 6000 1
200 1 7000 1
300 1 8000 1
400 1 9000 1
500 1 10000 1
600 1 11000 1
700 1 12000 1
800 1 13000 1
900 1 14000 0.99991
1000 1 15000 0.99974
1500 1 16000 0.99974
2000 1 17000 0.99947
3000 1 18000 0.99912
4000 1 19000 0.99886
5000 1 20000 0.99868
7.3 Simple Substitution Distance Method
To test the enhancement against Simple Substitution Distance method, we used
the same setup. Now we have 25 different morphed versions of given malware with
100 to 20000 deadcode functions. After doing regression testing on all these cases,
we found that Simple Substitution Distance Method can clearly distinguish between
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Figure 17: Opcode Graph Similarity Method AUC Analysis
malware files and benign files upto 5000 deadcode functions. After that AUC starts
decreasing slowly. Table 14 gives complete list of AUCs in this experiment and its
trend can be observed in Figure 18. Corresponding ROC curves are shown in Ap-
pendix A, Section A.3.
Table 14: AUC for Simple Substitution Distance Method
Functions AUC Functions AUC
100 1 6000 1
200 1 7000 1
300 1 8000 1
400 1 9000 1
500 1 10000 1
600 1 11000 0.96133
700 1 12000 0.92400
800 1 13000 0.78800
900 1 14000 0.19467
1000 1 15000 0.17067
1500 1 16000 0.11833
2000 1 17000 0.25833
3000 1 18000 0.33667
4000 1 19000 0.24000
5000 1 20000 0.15833
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Figure 18: Simple Substitution Distance Method AUC Analysis
Figure 19: Singular Value Decomposition AUC Analysis
7.4 Singular Value Decomposition Method
To evade detection by the Singular Value Decomposition method, we used the
same experimental setup. We started with 100 deadcode functions and went on till
10000 deadcode functions. It has been observed that with the increase in deadcode
functions, AUC kept decreasing. At 9000 deadcode functions, AUC went below 0.5
which means results of the method are no better than tossing a coin. Change in AUC
can be visualized by graph shown in Figure 19. Complete list of AUC is listed in
Table 15. Corresponding ROC curves are shown in Appendix A, Section A.4.
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Table 15: AUC for Singular Value Decomposition Method
Functions AUC Functions AUC
100 0.89754 6000 0.56608
200 0.88719 7000 0.54653
300 0.89045 8000 0.52633
400 0.88477 9000 0.49789
500 0.87839 10000 0.47226
600 0.86709 11000 0.45442
700 0.84899 12000 0.43638
800 0.83663 13000 0.41377
900 0.83045 14000 0.39261
1000 0.83141 15000 0.38166
1500 0.81121 16000 0.37638
2000 0.77688 17000 0.36583
3000 0.70849 18000 0.35678
4000 0.67116 19000 0.34271
5000 0.60020 20000 0.32764
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion and Future Work
The aim of this experiment was to design and test a system to detect meta-
morphic JavaScript malware. We adopted a new approach of statistical analysis for
JavaScript malware. In this approach, we compiled JavaScript into Java class files
using Rhino—a JavaScript Engine. We decompiled these class files and extracted a
sequence of Java bytecode. Using Hidden Markov Model, Opcode Graph Similarity,
Simple Substitution Distance and Singular Value decomposition techniques, we com-
pared similarity between morphed files and random benign files. It was found that the
given malware Transcriptase is detectable using these techniques as morphed versions
exhibits same statistical properties.
Detection by using these methods can be evaded by adding deadcode. During our
experiments, it was observed that Hidden Markov Model, Opcode Graph Similarity,
Simple Substitution Distance and Singular Value Decomposition starts misclassifica-
tion between JavaScript malware and benign files at 3000, 100, 5500 and 100 deadcode
functions respectively. This shows that the Opcode Graph Similarity and Singular
Value Decomposition techniques are very sensitive to deadcode which concludes that
these two techniques can classify files having highly similar opcode statistics.
The approach discussed in this paper can be used for all metamorphic JavaScript
malware files. A generic system can thus be designed for classifying JavaScript files
as the primary step of web security system. As Hidden Markov Model and Simple
Substitution Distance techniques can classify files with considerable amount of dead-
code. Use of these methods in web security system to classify JavaScript files will
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give cluster of suspicious JavaScript files. This will help to reduce the huge set of
malware under consideration into a small subset.
Future work for this experiment can include enhancing malware. In our experi-
ments, we used enhanced malware which creates connection with some remote server
to get deadcode functions. The malware script can be modified in such a way that it
will gather function definitions from other benign JavaScript files in that folder and
use them as deadcode at the time of infection. This will avoid connection with some
static server for deadcode which could be exploited for detection of morphed copies
of the malware.
The given malware uses custom designed meta-language for carrying its code.
Presently, there is one to one static mapping between meta-language symbols and
original JavaScript literals. This static mapping can be made dynamic, so that after
each new infection meta-language code will also change. This enforcement will reduce
the chances of getting detected because of static meta-language code. Mapping of
symbols can be passed as configuration to meta-language compiler.
Future work can also include developing a browser plugin for meta-morphic
JavaScript malware detection. As JavaScript malware executes in browsers and
JavaScript Engine is a part of the browser, modified Rhino described in this paper
can be used to develop a browser plugin which will take opcode sequence generated
by modified Rhino and verify JavaScript at page load time. If JavaScript is found to
be malicious, then it can restrict page load events or browser capabilities. This will
provide dynamic protection from malware infecting through browser.
53
LIST OF REFERENCES
[1] B. Anderson, et al. Graph-based Malware Detection using Dynamic Analysis.
Journal of Computer Virology, Volume 7, Issue 4, pp. 247–258. (2011)
[2] S. Attaluri, S. McGhee, and M. Stamp. Profile Hidden Markov Models and Meta-
morphic Virus Detection. Journal in Computer Virology, Volume 5, Issue 2,
pp. 151–169. (2009)
[3] T. Austin, E. Filiol, S. Josse, M. Stamp. Exploring Hidden Markov Models for
Virus Analysis: A Semantic Approach. Proceedings of 46th Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences. (2013)
[4] A. P. Bradley. The use of the Area Under the ROC Curve in the Evaluation of
Machine Learning Algorithms. Journal Pattern Recognition, Volume 30, Issue 7,
pp. 1145–1159. (1997)
[5] Cassandra Library. http://cassandra.apache.org/
[6] E. Daoud, I. Jebril. Computer Virus Strategies and Detection Methods. Inter-
national Journal of Open Problems in Computer Science and Mathematics, Vol-
ume 1, Issue 2. http://www.emis.de/journals/IJOPCM/files/IJOPCM(vol.
1.2.3.S.08).pdf (2008)
[7] DataTables Library. https://github.com/DataTables/DataTables
[8] P. Desai. Towards an Undetectable Computer Virus. Master’s Projects. Paper 90.
http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_projects/90. (2008)
[9] S. Deshpande, Y. Park, and M. Stamp. Eigenvalue Analysis for Metamorphic
Detection.
[10] Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques.(2012)
[11] T. Fawcett. An Introduction to ROC Analysis. http://people.inf.elte.hu/
kiss/13dwhdm/roc.pdf
[12] D. Flanagan. JavaScript: The Definitive Guide, 6th Edition.
[13] T. Jakobsen. A Fast Method for the Cryptanalysis of Substitution Ciphers. Cryp-
tologia, Volume 19,pp. 265–274. (1995)
[14] R. Jidigam, et al. Metamorphic Detection Using Singular Value Decomposition,
Master’s Project. Paper 330. http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_projects/
330. (2013)
54
[15] Jquery Library. http://jquery.com/
[16] D. Lin, M. Stamp. Hunting for Undetectable Metamorphic Viruses. Journal in
Computer Virology, Volume 7, Issue 3, pp. 201–214. (2011)
[17] Metamorphism and Self-Compilation in JavaScript. http://spth.virii.lu/
MSCJS.txt
[18] D. W. Mount. Bioinformatics: Sequence and Genome Analysis. Cold Spring Har-
bor Laboratory. (2004)
[19] N. Provos, P. Mavrommatis, M. Rajab, F. Monrose. All Your iFRAMEs Point
to Us. Proceedings of the 17th Conference on Security Symposium. (2008)
[20] B. Rad, M. Masrom, S. Ibrahim. Camouflage in Malware: from Encryption to
Metamorphism. International Journal of Computer Science and Network Secu-
rity, Volume 12, Issue 8, pp. 74. (2012)
[21] Rhino Documentation. https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Rhino_
documentation
[22] N. Runwal, R. M. Low, and M. Stamp. Opcode Graph Similarity and Metamor-
phic Detection. Journal in Computer Virology, Volume 8, Issue 1-2, pp. 37–52.
(2012)
[23] G. Shanmugam, R. Low, M. Stamp. Simple Substitution Distance and Metamor-
phic Detection. Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques, Volume
9, Issue 3, pp. 159–170. (2013)
[24] SOPHOS Securtiy Threat Report. http://www.sophos.com/en-us/
medialibrary/PDFs/other/sophossecuritythreatreport2013.pdf. (2013)
[25] Source of Transcriptase JavaScript Malware. http://spth.virii.lu/
Transcriptase.rar
[26] S. Sridhara. Metamorphic Worm that Carries its Own Morphing Engine. Journal
of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques, Volume 9, Issue 2, pp. 49–58.
(2013)
[27] M. Stamp. A Revealing Introduction to Hidden Markov Models. http://www.
cs.sjsu.edu/~stamp/RUA/HMM.pdf. (2012)
[28] P. Szor. The Art of Computer Virus Research and Defense. Addison-Wesley
Professional. (2005)
[29] P. Szor, P. Ferrie. Hunting for Metamorphic, Symantec Security Response. http:
//www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/hunting.for.metamorphic.pdf
55
[30] S. Venkatachalam. Detecting Undetectable Computer Viruses. Master’s Projects.
Paper 156. http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_projects/156. (2010)
[31] A. Venkatesan. Code Obfuscation and Virus Detection. Master’s Projects. Pa-
per 116. http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_projects/116. (2008)
[32] Walenstein, R. Mathur, M. Chouchane, R. Chouchane, and A. Lakhotia. The
Design Space of Metamorphic Malware. In Proceedings of the 2nd International
Conference on Information Warfare. (2007)
[33] Working of Rhino. http://www.quora.com/JavaScript-programming-language/
How-does-a-JavaScript-engine-work
[34] W. Wong. Analysis and Detection of Metamorphic Computer Viruses. Mas-
ter’s Projects. Paper 153. http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_projects/
153. (2006)
[35] W. Xu, F. Zhang, S. Zhu. The Power of Obfuscation Techniques in Mali-
cious JavaScript Code: A Measurement Study.Malicious and Unwanted Software
(MALWARE), 7th International Conference, Volume 7, pp. 9–16. (202)
[36] YUI Library. http://yuilibrary.com/
[37] P. Zbitskiy. Code Mutation Techniques by means of Formal Grammars and Au-
tomatons. Journal in Computer Virology, Volume 5, Issue 3, pp 199–207. (2009)
56
APPENDIX
ROC curves
A.1 Hidden Markov Model
Figure A.20: ROC for 2500 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.21: ROC for 3000 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.22: ROC for 3500 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.23: ROC for 4000 Functions
for HMM
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Figure A.24: ROC for 4500 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.25: ROC for 5000 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.26: ROC for 5500 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.27: ROC for 6000 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.28: ROC for 6500 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.29: ROC for 7000 Functions
for HMM
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Figure A.30: ROC for 7500 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.31: ROC for 8000 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.32: ROC for 8500 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.33: ROC for 9000 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.34: ROC for 9500 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.35: ROC for 10000 Functions
for HMM
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Figure A.36: ROC for 10500 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.37: ROC for 11000 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.38: ROC for 11500 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.39: ROC for 12000 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.40: ROC for 12500 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.41: ROC for 13000 Functions
for HMM
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Figure A.42: ROC for 13500 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.43: ROC for 14000 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.44: ROC for 14500 Functions
for HMM
Figure A.45: ROC for 15000 Functions
for HMM
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A.2 Opcode Graph Similarity Method
Figure A.46: ROC for 100 Functions
for OGS
Figure A.47: ROC for 200 Functions
for OGS
Figure A.48: ROC for 300 Functions
for OGS
Figure A.49: ROC for 400 Functions
for OGS
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Figure A.50: ROC for 500 Functions
for OGS
Figure A.51: ROC for 600 Functions
for OGS
Figure A.52: ROC for 700 Functions
for OGS
Figure A.53: ROC for 800 Functions
for OGS
Figure A.54: ROC for 900 Functions
for OGS
Figure A.55: ROC for 1000 Functions
for OGS
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Figure A.56: ROC for 2000 Functions
for OGS
Figure A.57: ROC for 3000 Functions
for OGS
Figure A.58: ROC for 4000 Functions
for OGS
Figure A.59: ROC for 5000 Functions
for OGS
Figure A.60: ROC for 6000 Functions
for OGS
Figure A.61: ROC for 7000 Functions
for OGS
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Figure A.62: ROC for 8000 Functions
for OGS
Figure A.63: ROC for 9000 Functions
for OGS
Figure A.64: ROC for 10000 Functions
for OGS
Figure A.65: ROC for 11000 Functions
for OGS
Figure A.66: ROC for 12000 Functions
for OGS
Figure A.67: ROC for 13000 Functions
for OGS
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Figure A.68: ROC for 14000 Functions
for OGS
Figure A.69: ROC for 15000 Functions
for OGS
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A.3 Simple Substitution Distance Method
Figure A.70: ROC for 5000 Functions
for SSM
Figure A.71: ROC for 5500 Functions
for SSM
Figure A.72: ROC for 6000 Functions
for SSM
Figure A.73: ROC for 6500 Functions
for SSM
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Figure A.74: ROC for 7000 Functions
for SSM
Figure A.75: ROC for 7500 Functions
for SSM
Figure A.76: ROC for 8000 Functions
for SSM
Figure A.77: ROC for 8500 Functions
for SSM
Figure A.78: ROC for 9000 Functions
for SSM
Figure A.79: ROC for 9500 Functions
for SSM
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Figure A.80: ROC for 10000 Functions
for SSM
Figure A.81: ROC for 10500 Functions
for SSM
Figure A.82: ROC for 11000 Functions
for SSM
Figure A.83: ROC for 11500 Functions
for SSM
Figure A.84: ROC for 12000 Functions
for SSM
Figure A.85: ROC for 12500 Functions
for SSM
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Figure A.86: ROC for 13000 Functions
for SSM
Figure A.87: ROC for 13500 Functions
for SSM
Figure A.88: ROC for 14000 Functions
for SSM
Figure A.89: ROC for 14500 Functions
for SSM
Figure A.90: ROC for 15000 Functions
for SSM
Figure A.91: ROC for 15500 Functions
for SSM
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A.4 Singular Value Decomposition Method
Figure A.92: ROC for 100 Functions
for SVD
Figure A.93: ROC for 200 Functions
for SVD
Figure A.94: ROC for 300 Functions
for SVD
Figure A.95: ROC for 400 Functions
for SVD
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Figure A.96: ROC for 500 Functions
for SVD
Figure A.97: ROC for 600 Functions
for SVD
Figure A.98: ROC for 700 Functions
for SVD
Figure A.99: ROC for 800 Functions
for SVD
Figure A.100: ROC for 900 Functions
for SVD
Figure A.101: ROC for 1000 Func-
tions for SVD
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Figure A.102: ROC for 1100 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.103: ROC for 1200 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.104: ROC for 1300 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.105: ROC for 1400 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.106: ROC for 1500 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.107: ROC for 1600 Func-
tions for SVD
73
Figure A.108: ROC for 1700 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.109: ROC for 1800 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.110: ROC for 1900 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.111: ROC for 2000 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.112: ROC for 2100 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.113: ROC for 2200 Func-
tions for SVD
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Figure A.114: ROC for 2300 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.115: ROC for 2400 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.116: ROC for 2300 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.117: ROC for 2400 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.118: ROC for 2300 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.119: ROC for 2400 Func-
tions for SVD
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Figure A.120: ROC for 2500 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.121: ROC for 2600 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.122: ROC for 2700 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.123: ROC for 2800 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.124: ROC for 2900 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.125: ROC for 3000 Func-
tions for SVD
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Figure A.126: ROC for 3500 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.127: ROC for 4000 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.128: ROC for 4500 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.129: ROC for 5000 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.130: ROC for 5500 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.131: ROC for 6000 Func-
tions for SVD
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Figure A.132: ROC for 6500 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.133: ROC for 7000 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.134: ROC for 7500 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.135: ROC for 8000 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.136: ROC for 8500 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.137: ROC for 9000 Func-
tions for SVD
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Figure A.138: ROC for 9500 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.139: ROC for 10000 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.140: ROC for 10500 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.141: ROC for 11000 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.142: ROC for 12500 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.143: ROC for 12000 Func-
tions for SVD
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Figure A.144: ROC for 12500 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.145: ROC for 13000 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.146: ROC for 13500 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.147: ROC for 14000 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.148: ROC for 14500 Func-
tions for SVD
Figure A.149: ROC for 15000 Func-
tions for SVD
80
